When does dust, odour and noise become 'nuisance'? Insights from Andrews v Krononspan

In September 2025, HHJ Stephen Davies (sitting as a High Court Judge) in the Technology and Construction Court in Manchester, handed down judgment in a group litigation case brought by a large number of residents in the town of Chirk (near Wrexham) against a company called Kronospan Limited (Kronospan).

Kronospan operate a factory in the area concerned with the manufacture of MDF and other types of boarding and laminates. 

Parties’ position

The claimants argued that the release of dust, odour or noise on a regular basis amounted to nuisance. Kronospan defended the claims, arguing that the test for nuisance had not been made out but that if it was established that their use of the site was that of an ordinary user and that they had taken reasonable steps to reduce any nuisance (including by the use of Best Available Techniques (BAT)).

Had threshold for nuisance been met?

The Judge needed to consider whether the threshold for nuisance had been met – whether there had been “a substantial interference with the ordinary use of each of the lead claimant’s properties”. In so doing he considered at length the legal test for nuisance, extensive witness and expert evidence (as to dust issues). However, whilst recognising that it was “close to the borderline”, ultimately the Judge concluded that he was not “satisfied that the impact or frequency is sufficiently substantial” to meet the threshold.

The Judge was not satisfied with the regularity or nature of the claimed interference and found “significant exaggeration” in the claimants’ evidence. The Judge noted the extent of regulation (including environmental) to which Kronospan were subject and the relationship of this issue to nuisance.

Expert evidence

The Judge highlighted there was no “scientific evidence” presented that the emissions caused injury to the claimants or others. As to the claimants’ experts, the Judge expressed concerns:

Obiter arguments

The Judge went onto consider on an obiter basis that had nuisance been established, he would have rejected Kronospan’s argument that they had been using the site as an “ordinary user” since the evidence was that there had been a large increase in operations over a relatively brief period which resulted in the claimed interference.

In which case he would not have needed to consider the reasonableness of the steps that Kronospan had taken to reduce any nuisance because this not a separate defence to ordinary user. However, if he had needed to consider the reasonableness of their steps to minimise interference he would have found that Kronospan had satisfied that obligation.

Comment 

The decision helpfully reviews the present thresholds for nuisance and available defences, and recognises the relatively high hurdle for claimants particularly where defendants are businesses already, subject to extensive regulation. The case is also a reminder of the need for experts (and those instructing them) to remember the experts’ duties to the Court and to avoid any perception that any part of their approach arises from a desire for the clients’ case to succeed.