Browne Jacobson has secured a successful defence in KHX v Isle of Wight Council [2026] EWHC 1949 (KB), in what is believed to be the first judgment to consider the scope of the new limitation provisions for abuse claims under the Crime and Policing Act 2026.

Ms Justice Obi handed down judgment on 30 July 2026, finding that the new provisions apply only to the sexual abuse elements of a claim in which both sexual and physical abuse are alleged.

This was contrary to the position of the claimant that the physical abuse allegations would also fall for consideration under the new regime. Browne Jacobson LLP instructed James Weston of 7 Bedford Row. 

The new limitation regime for sexual abuse claims

The effect of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 was the addition of two new sections to the part of the Limitation Act 1980 which deals with time limits for injury claims. 

Section 11ZA is called “Actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse” and provides that time limits do not apply to actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty  when three conditions are met. Those are: 

1. The damages consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the claimant.
2. The claimant was under 18 when the cause of action accrued.
3. The act or omission to which the claimant’s personal injuries were attributable consisted of sexual abuse.  

Section 11ZB then qualifies this for cases where the defendant satisfies the Court it is no longer possible for a fair hearing to take place. 

This section came into force on 29 June 2026.

Case background: KHX v Isle of Wight Council

This claim concerned allegations of abuse by two individuals, both of whom had been employees of the defendant. Against one, only physical abuse was alleged. Against the other, allegations were of sexual abuse. 

Limitation was not pursued at trial in relation to the alleged sexual abuse. It was pursued in relation to the physical abuse, the alleged perpetrator of that abuse having died prior to trial, though hearsay evidence was available. 

The limitation issue

The defendant’s position as to limitation was that while the sexual abuse allegations were subject to the new regime, limitation in relation to physical abuse had to be considered under the pre-existing regime. This meant that for the physical abuse allegations, the claimant would have to persuade the Judge to exercise her discretion under s33 of the Limitation Act.

Claimant counsel, Justin Levenson, put forward an argument that s11ZA was broader than this. In particular, the language of ‘action’ could be contrasted with cause of action’ and ‘includes’ was expansive, meaning that once the provision was triggered by an element of sexual abuse forming part of the proceedings, it applied to the entire claim. He referred the Court to the decision in Azaz v Denton [2009] EWHC 1758 (QB), an authority on the interpretation of section 11 of the Limitation Act.

The defendant maintained that while (consistent with other parts of the legislation) ‘includes’ had been specifically adopted in relation to the first condition, it had been deliberately excluded from the third by the drafters. This limited the effect of the section to those parts of proceedings which concerned sexual abuse. 

The judgment

Ms Justice Obi heard the trial over 14 and 15 July 2026 and handed down judgment on 30 July. 

The claim was dismissed in its entirety, based on the judge’s assessment that the claimant had not proved, on the balance of probabilities, that either the alleged sexual or physical abuse occurred. 

In relation to the treatment of limitation relating to the physical abuse, the judge dealt with the issue beginning at paragraph 86 of her judgment. She concluded that Parliament had enacted a test comprised of three cumulative conditions, each of which must be satisfied. Condition three was drafted in a way which was inconsistent with the proposition that distinct allegations of physical abuse were brought within s11ZA solely because they were advanced alongside allegations of sexual abuse. Azaz v Denton, which concerned s11 of the Act, did not override the clear wording of condition three. 

The judge observed that this case, itself, demonstrated the difficulty with the claimant’s proposition. The claim had two distinct allegations against two different alleged tortfeasors. Against one of those there were only alleged acts of physical abuse. That the allegations were pursued in the same proceedings as allegations of sexual abuse did not satisfy the wording of condition three. 

Implications for defendants and insurers facing mixed abuse claims

This is an important early decision in relation to a key development in claims arising from childhood abuse. Organisations exposed to these claims, and their insurers, have understood for some time that a change to the law for sexual abuse claims was coming, and have prepared for this. 

The suggestion that physical abuse claims would also be affected appears to go beyond the policy decisions behind the new provisions of the Act, and to disregard a longstanding view of the Courts that limitation in relation to physical abuse does raise different considerations to sexual abuse, although previously both were considered under s33. The claimant’s proposition also risked creating two-tier justice for victims of physical abuse, whereby only those victims of physical abuse who also suffered sexual abuse would be considered under the new regime. 

The decision of the judge that physical abuse is not caught within s11ZA merely because it forms part of proceedings in which sexual abuse is also alleged is therefore important. It has seemed clear throughout debate on the Bill that Parliament’s intention was to introduce a special test for limitation for sexual abuse allegations. Had it intended to encompass physical abuse, or the whole of any claim which contained an allegation of sexual abuse, then this would have been reflected in the drafting. 

It is important to remember that the discretion under s33 remains available to a judge in relation to physical abuse allegations, leaving a broad discretion to allow claims to proceed in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, the judge did exercise that discretion in the present case, reflecting the efforts we made on the part of the defendant to ensure that such evidence as could be obtained was before the Court, including documents from earlier police investigations and a hearsay statement taken prior to the death of the alleged perpetrator. 

Counsel, James Weston of 7 Bedford Row, adds:

“The decision on s11ZA must be the right one. Whilst s11 in Azaz was interpreted to include the whole of a mixed claim, the language in s11ZA is materially different. The relevant conditions must be met under s11ZA(2) and not just be included as per s11. The purpose of the reform was to put childhood sexual abuse in its own category as regards delay. It was, on the face of the statute, not Parliament’s intention to extend this to other parts of mixed claims.”

At the time of writing, it is unclear whether the decision will be appealed.